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LEGISLATIVE LIMITATION ON AIR POLLUTION
ENFORCEMENT
By RUPERT H. RIicKSEN*
With the ever increasing problem of smog and air pollution, questions
have arisen as to the enforcement of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1947
which has been incorporated into the Health and Safety Code.' This article
will attempt to point out problems which might be involved when dealing
with manufacturing and industrial operations with particular emphasis
upon Health and Safety Code, sections 24242 and 24243 2 for the prosecu-
tion, and Code of Civil Procedure section 731 (a)3 for the defense. Is there
a conflict between these sections? When can section 731 (a) be invoked?
What are the exceptions to section 731 (a)? What elements must be proved
in order to obtain a conviction under sections 24242 and 24243? These
questions and others will be discussed in this article.
I. Validity and constitutionality of Health and Safety Code
Sections 24242 and 24243
Section 24242 provides that a person may not discharge into the atmos-
phere any contaminant for a period aggregating more than three minutes
in an hour of a shade and opacity as dark or darker as that designated
number two on the Ringleman Chart. The Ringleman Chart is a chart pub-
lished by the United States Bureau of Mines used to determine shade and
opacity of air contaminants and the constitutional focal point is centered
around the use of the Ringleman Chart to determine the necessary shade
and opacity needed for a violation of this section., In People v. Interna-
tional Steel Corp.,5 defendant was convicted of violating Health and Safety
Code section 24242 in its operation of burning auto bodies. The defendant
had appealed on the basis that the prohibitory provisions of this law were
unconstitutional. The court held that the use of the Ringleman Chart was
constitutional since a statute may refer to and adopt for expression of
the legislative intent a statute, rule or regulation of another state or of the
United States, and it seemed therefore equally permissible to use an official
publication of the United States or Bureau established by law such as the
* Member, Second-Year Class.
ICAL. STATs. 1947, c. 632, p. 1640: CAr.. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 24198-24341 com-
prise this act.
-
2 CAL. HIEALTr'AD SAFETY CODE §§ 24242 and 24243.
3 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 731 (a).
4 CAL. HEALTH An SAFETY CODE § 24242: "A person shall not discharge into the atmos-
phere from any single source of emission whatsoever any air contaminant for a period or periods
aggregating more than three minutes in any one hour which is:
a) As dark or darker in shade as that designated as No. 2 on the Ringleman Chart as
published by the United States Bureau of Mines, or
b) of such an opacity as to obscure an observer's view to a degree equal to or greater
than does smoke described in sub. sec. (a) of this section."
5102 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 226 P.2d 587 (1957).
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Bureau of Mines. The court further held that the shade of smoke dis-
charged as limited by section 24242 was sufficiently described and certain
in the section, and that section 24242 was not unreasonable nor discrimina-
tory merely because emission of a shade of smoke lighter than that which
is prohibited might cause more contaminant if allowed for a long period of
time than emission of prohibited shade for only a short time beyond the
prohibited period.
In a later case, People v. Plywood Manufacturers of California,' the
constitutionality of section 24242 was reaffirmed over an objection that
there was unconstitutional uncertainty introduced by reference to the Rin-
gleman Chart and those who would be observers. The court held that due
process was satisfied because the use of the Ringleman Chart was suffici-
ently definite, and the fact that an average individual might not be able to
identify such violation would not render it unconstitutional.
The use and applicability of section 24242 was again upheld in People
v. Southern Pacific Company7 where defendant allowed a fire to burn on its
premises for a period in excess of four hours emitting smoke of such a shade
and opacity as to violate the requisites for liability as established in section
24242.
The unconstitutionality of section 24243 has never been put into issue.
In view of the fact that a presumption of constitutionality protects every
legislative act and it is the duty of the courts to so construe legislative
enactments as to uphold their constitutionality if possible, it seems likely
that section 24243 will weather any constitutional attack.8 Furthermore
section 24243 and Civil Code section 3479 are similar in their terms and
legislative intent in that the object of each is to do away with operations
that create nuisances and disturb a considerable number of people. There-
fore, it appears that these sections are analagous in their purpose. Section
24243 provides that a person shall not discharge a quantity of air contami-
nant or other material which causes injury, annoyance or nuisance to any
considerable number of people or which endangers the comfort, health and
safety of such people or the public.' Civil Code section 3479 provides that
anything which is injurious to health or is indecent or offensive to the senses
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property or
obstructs free passage of lakes, highways etc. is a nuisance. 10 The use of
Civil Code 3479 has been upheld in a number of cases." Therefore it seems
logical that section 24243 will also be upheld when applied.
6 137 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955).
7 150 Cal. App. 2d 815, 311 P.2d 200 (1957).
8 People v. Amdur, 123 Cal. App. 2d 951, 267 P.2d 445 (1954).
9 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 24243: "A person shall not discharge from any source
whatsoever such quantity of air contaminant or other material which cause injury, detriment,
nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public or which endan-
ger the comfort, repose, health or safety of any such persons or the public, or which cause or
have a natural tendency to cause injury or damage to business or property."
10 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 3479.
"Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 622, 299 Pac. 720 (1931); Centoni v. Ingalls,
113 Cal. App. 192, 298 Pac. 47 (1931); Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 Pac. 319 (1926).
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Any violation of sections 24242 or 24243 may be enjoined in a civil ac-
tion brought in the name of the People of the State of California,' or may
be prosecuted as a misdemeanor."3 It has been held that the only proof
necessary to warrant a conviction under section 24242 is that a contaminant
was discharged into the atmosphere and that it was of the specified shade
and darkness prohibited.' 4
II. Code of Civil Procedure 731 (a) and its effect
Section 731 (a) provides that whenever a business is in a proper zone or
district under authority of law wherein its uses are expressly permitted, the
business shall not be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive process from
a reasonable and necessary operation nor shall such use be deemed a nui-
sance without evidence of employment of unnecessary and injurious meth-
ods of operation.' 5
The purpose of the addition of section 731 (a) to Code of Civil Proce-
dure was aptly set out in Gelfand v. O'Haver 6 where the court said:
"Prior to the addition of section 731 (a) the law was settled that a person
could enjoin certain conduct as a nuisance even though the business was
conducted in a district zoned to permit business of the type of which the
complaint was made and the defendant was making an effort to operate his
business in a careful and efficient manner. In the light of this, the manifest
purport of the adoption of section 731 (a) was to eliminate injunctive relief
where the business is operated in its appropriate zone and the only showing
was injury or nuisance to the plaintiff in such operation. He must now show
more, namely, that the defendant employed unnecessary and injurious
methods in the operation of the business."
While this section substantially changed the law it is limited in its oper-
ation. The limitations and exceptions are as follows:
First, the section expressly exempts the application of the section in an
action to abate a public nuisance brought in the name of the people of Cali-
fornia. This was the effect of the amendment of 1947. When the statute was
first passed in 1935 there was talk of the possibility of it being broad
enough to apply to actions to abate a public nuisance. As has been said this
was taken care of by expressly adding to the statute that such an action
would make section 731 (a) inapplicable.
12 CAL. HEA.TH AN SArzTY CODE § 24252.
33 CAL. HsTH m SinAP CODE § 24253.
14 Supra note 6.
15 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 731(a): "Whenever any city, city and county, or county, shall
have established zones or districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or
commercial uses are expressly permitted, except in an action to abate a public nuisance brought
in the name of the people of California, no person or persons, firm or corporation shall be en-
joined or restrained by the injunctive process from the reasonable and necessary operation in
any such industrial or commercial zone of any use expressly permitted therein, nor shall such
use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation.
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation and working hours of canneries,
fertilization plants, refineries and other similar establishments whose operations produce offen-
sive odors."
16 33 Cal. 2d 218, 220, 221, 200 P.2d 790, 791 (1948).
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Second, the section expressly exempts application in the "regulation and
working hours of canneries, fertilization plants, refineries and other similar
establishments whose operations produce offensive odors." There may be
some -problem in determining what is meant by "other similar establish-
ments whose operations produce offensive odors." Is this exemption limited
to offensive odors or can it apply to non odoriferous air pollutants which
might in one way or another be injurious to health and comfort? These
questions will undoubtedly have to be decided by later judicial decisions.
Third, this section does not prevent recovery of damages but simply
provides that "no one shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive
process." In Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co." the court recognized
the validity of section 731 (a) but allowed an action for damages and in
McNeill v. Redington'8 even though defendant's operation was permitted
by zoning requirements and the method of operation employed by the de-
fendant was expressly found by the court to be reasonable and necessary,
an award of damages on a cause of action in the nature of trespass was held
allowable. The court stated that section 731 (a) ".... . has no application
because it does not purport, either expressly or by implication, to extend to
trespassory invasion of another's property."
Fourth, while the section in certain cases does bar the issuance of an
injunction, it certainly does not bar injunction where there is use of unnec-
essary and injurious methods of operation. This is illustrated in the case of
Gelfand v. O'Haver,9 which involved a music studio emitting noise to the
disturbance of neighboring residents. It was established that there was no
effort to control such emission of noise by soundproofing or any other
means and, therefore, the method of operation was unreasonable and un-
necessary. Injunctive relief was allowed. Although this case involves noise,
the principle can by analogy be used in a case dealing with smog. In this
same case, in determining what is necessary to establish unnecessary and
injurious operation, the court said that failure to pursue methods custom-
arily employed in a similar business in the vicinity was not the only evi-
dence that would establish unnecessary and injurious method of operation
and, although it was relevant, it was not indispensible. In Hannum v.
Gruber 20 it was said:
"If devices or more efficient management which would reduce the smoke,
odors, gases, smudge and noises and vibrations issuing from its plant, are
available to the defendant at a reasonable expense, it is the duty of the
defendant to secure such devices or management and if it fails to do so the
smoke, noises, etc., emitting from its plant may be regarded as unnecessary
and unreasonable."
17 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955).
18 67 Cal. App. 2d 315, 154 P.2d 428 (1944).
19 Supra note 16.
20 346 Pa. 417, 31 A. 2d 99, 102 (1943).
[Vol. 9THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In other words, there is no set standard establishing what is unnecessary
and unreasonable, but the circumstances in each case must be considered to
determine what is an unreasonable and unnecessary operation.
Having discussed the limitations of section 731 (a) the areas of its ap-
plicability follow.
First, the section is only applicable when the business sought to be en-
joined is operating in an area wherein the type of use is permissible and
expressly permitted to the particular business."1 The reason for this is that
the section expressly requires that to be free from injunctive restraint the
business must be properly zoned and its uses "expressly permitted." Such
use is not to be deemed a nuisance without evidence of employment of un-
necessary and injurious methods of operation. It follows, therefore, that if
the business is not properly zoned or its uses not expressly permitted the
section would not apply.
Prior to the enactment of section 731 (a) several cases had held that the
mere fact that operations were permitted and in a district properly zoned
for such uses could not avail the defendant. Also, that one may not use his
property even in and about a lawful business if it be used in such a manner
as to seriously interfere with another in the enjoyment of his right in the
use of his property.2 2 These cases, however, do not appear to be authority
at present since section 731 (a) purports to protect the business where the
use of unreasonable and unnecessary method of operation could not be
established.
Second, section 731 (a) is applicable to prevent a suit for injunction by
a private person where unreasonable and unnecessary methods of operation
are not established, provided the defendant business is in the proper zone
and its uses expressly permitted.
The validity of section 731 (a) has been upheld in a number of cases.a
In Wheeler v. Gregg24 a gravel plant was given a "conditional use permit"
under the cities zoning ordinance. The court held that this was sufficient to
bring it within the protection of section 731 (a). In Northside Property
Owners Association v. Hillside Memorial Park5 the court held section 731
(a) to be applicable in an action to enjoin a corporation from establishing
and maintaining a cemetery under a permit granted by- the County Board
of Supervisors.
21 Markey v. Danville Warehouse and Lumber Inc., 119 Cal. App. 2d 1, 269 P.2d 19 (1953).
22;Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933); Vowinkle v. N. Clark and Sons,
216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932) ; Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259
Pac. 484 (1927); Judson v. L.A. Suburban Gas Co., 151 Cal. 169, 106 Pac. 581 (1910); Tueb-
ner v. Cal. St. Ry., 66 Cal. 171, 4 Pac. 1162 (1884).
23Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 266, 288 P.2d 507 (1955) ; Markey v.
Danville Warehouse and Lumber Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 1, 259 P.2d 19 (1953); Wheeler v. Gregg,
90 Cal. App. 2d 369, 203 P.2d 37 (1949) ; Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790
(1948); Northside Property Owners Ass'n. v. Hillside Memorial Park, 70 Cal. App. 2d 609,
161 P.2d 618 (1945).
24 Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal.App. 2d 369, 202 P.2d 37 (1949).
2 5 Northside Property Owners Ass'n v. Hillside Memorial Park, 70 Cal. App. 2d 609, 161
P.2d 618 (1945).
COMM~iENTSFeb., 1958]
III. Problems that may arise when these particular sections
are invoked in the same suit
It has been established earlier that there are only two types of actions
that can be brought under section 24242 and 24243, namely, an action for
an injunction or a prosecution for a misdemeanor.
First, assuming an action is brought against a business charging a mis-
demeanor under section 24242, and 731 (a) has been invoked in defense,
what will be the result? Such a case would arise with the prosecution claim-
ing a violation of section 24242 in that defendant discharged into the air a
contaminant for a period exceeding three minutes in an hour and which was
as dark or darker than that allowed by use of the Ringleman Chart. The de-
fendant contends that his operation was properly zoned, that the uses were
expressly permitted and that such uses were reasonable and necessary. A
conflict arises. Although section 24242 does not contain nuisance language,
a violation of it, that is, a discharge into the atmosphere of air contami-
nants of considerable darkness and opacity may well lead to the nuisance
of smog. Section 731 (a) provides a defense against prosecution under nui-
sance statutes in certain instances as has been shown earlier. Since 731 (a)
was established to protect industry and is applicable when a business is
faced with a broad nuisance statute, it would seem by implication and legis-
lative intent that the defense provided by the section should be available
when section 24242 is invoked by the prosecution. By this analogy a con-
flict is present; section 24242 providing that such an operation is a misde-
meanor and section 731 (a) providing such an operation is allowable when
its requisites are complied, with.
The decision as to which section controls in this conflict might well be
affected by what the court favors preventing, that is, smog or interference
with industry. 731 (a) was added to the California statutes to protect in-
dustry. With the great industry we have today, discharges and emissions of
air contaminants are inevitable. The Air Pollution Control Act was adopted
to eliminate operations which might produce smog but such regulation
ought not to have the effect of eliminating industry at the same time. With
these ideas in mind it seems that the court might favor the non-interference
with industry where possible. Surely, if the prosecution could show un-
reasonable, unnecessary or injurious methods of operation, section 24242
would control since 731 (a) is not applicable in this situation. However, here
we are not concerned with the area in which these factors have been shown.
A logical interpretation of section 24242 seems to be that all uses
wherein contaminants are discharged in violation thereof ought to be a mis-
demeanor except in cases wherein it is established that section 731 (a) has
been strictly complied with. In other words when reading section 24242,
section 731 (a) ought to be read as an exception and therefore control in the
case where its requisites have been complied with.
A general rule of construction is that where two sections overlap and
one construction might obliterate one section, while another construction
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might allow each section to operate, that construction allowing each to op-
erate should be adopted. This interpretation does not abolish the effect of
section 24242 since the exception of section 731 (a) would apply to only one
particular area, specifically, when a business is properly zoned and its uses
expressly permitted and section 24242 would be fully in force as to the re-
maining areas which might be shown to be violative of the section. A further
argument supporting this interpretation is that since the entire body of law
in this state is contained in the codes, the codes can only be regarded and
construed together, and within such rule all parts of the statute must be
blended, construed, and harmonized together.6 In People v. Brown,2 7
where sections from the Civil Code and Health and Safety Code were in-
volved the court said: "All of the cited code provisions should be construed
together and harmonized wherever possible." In light of this reasoning the
logical interpretation of section 24242 just discussed seems even stronger
because in harmonizing and reading these sections (24242 and 731 (a))
together, the outcome ought to be that section 24242 should be read with
section 731 (a) as an exception, when its terms are complied with.
Second, assuming an action is brought under section 24243 charging a
misdemeanor and section 731 (a) is invoked as a defense. What result?
The prosecution would contend that defendant had discharged such a
quantity of air contaminant that it caused a nuisance or annoyance to a con-
siderable number of persons, and that the health or safety and comfort of
these people was endangered. Defendant would invoke section 731 (a) and
contend that its terms had been complied with fully. It appears that a con-
flict is the result.
As has been shown earlier, section 24243 is similar in terms to Civil
Code section 3479 and by analogy can therefore be considered a nuisance
statute. With this interpretation this case is in effect a direct prosecution for
a nuisance under section 24243.
In defense of this prosecution the defendant invokes section 731 (a)
which states that expressly permitted uses shall not be "deemed a nuisance
without evidence of employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of
operation." In other words, there is a conflict as to what a nuisance may be
or is. Section 24243 states what a nuisance is and section 731(a) states
that certain operations may not be deemed a nuisance.
As was pointed out in the first problem where the prosecution was in-
voking section 24242, it seems that the blending and harmonizing of the
statutes would afford a remedy here and make section 731 (a) an implied
exception to section 24243 when unnecessary and unreasonable methods of
operation were not established. Also, whether the courts favor prevention
of smog, or non-interference with business might influence their decision
as to which section would control.
26 People v. Brown, 125 Cal. App. 2d 83, 269 P.2d 918 (1954) ; In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d
91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946) ; People v. Roland, 134 Cal. App. 675, 26 P.2d 517 (1933).
2 7 People v. Brown, 125 Cal. App. 2d 83, 269 P.2d 918 (1954).
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Another line of reasoning which might solve the problem is that section
24243 is a general statute while section 731 (a) is a specific statute pertain-
ing to one narrow area. In such cases it seems that the specific statute
would control the general in which case section 731 (a) would be a defense
if evidence of unreasonable and unnecessary methods of operation was not
introduced. In light of this reasoning, it seems that the logical interpreta-
tion of section 24243 would be that section 731 (a) is an exception.
It should be noted, however, that when an action to abate a public nui-
sance is brought in the name of the people of California under sections
24242 and 24243, the second type of action that may be brought, the other
being an action for a misdemeanor, section 731 (a) is inapplicable in such
an action because of the express exception which was added in 1947,
namely "except in an action to abate a public nuisance brought in the name
of the people of California."
IV. Conclusion
With the smog problem ever increasingly present and legislation on the
subject increasing, it seems that something should be done to alleviate the
apparent conflict pointed out above. Possibly, the legislature could amend
the Health and Safety Code sections to make 731 (a) an express exception
when the requirements of the section have been fully complied with. An-
other possibility is to blend and harmonize the sections as has been done
with other code sections when invoked in the same case. It seems harmoni-
zation of these statutes so as to read an implied exception into the Health
and Safety Code would at least be in order to deal reasonably and properly
in such cases.
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